security: round 3 hardening (CSRF double-submit, TRX MITM, container hardening)

2026-05-12 01:47:58 +03:00
parent c8bc40af97
commit 8dc0855827
37 changed files with 1852 additions and 318 deletions
--- a/apps/api/src/app.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/app.ts
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ import { swaggerSpec } from './config/swagger';
 import { traceMiddleware } from './middleware/trace';
 import { authMiddleware } from './middleware/auth';
 import { csrfMiddleware } from './middleware/csrf';
-import { globalLimiter, mutateLimiter, sensitiveLimiter } from './middleware/rate-limit';
+import { globalLimiter, mutateLimiter, sensitiveLimiter, mnemonicRevealLimiter } from './middleware/rate-limit';
 import { errorHandler } from './middleware/error-handler';
 import walletRoutes from './routes/wallet.routes';
 import relayProxyRoutes from './routes/relay-proxy.routes';
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ const protect = [authMiddleware, csrfMiddleware];

 // Sensitive — самый строгий лимит. Каждый POST защищён JWT + CSRF.
 app.use('/api/wallets/create', ...protect, sensitiveLimiter);
+app.use('/api/wallets/mnemonic/reveal', ...protect, mnemonicRevealLimiter);
 app.use('/api/wallets/:chain/send', ...protect, sensitiveLimiter);

 // Mutating (proxy + read endpoints) — повышенный лимит
--- a/apps/api/src/config/env.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/config/env.ts
@@ -31,11 +31,26 @@ export let env = {
    jwtKidPath: p.VAULT_JWT_KID_PATH || 'jwt/kid',
    jwtKidsPrefix: p.VAULT_JWT_KIDS_PREFIX || 'jwt/kids',
    csrfPath: p.VAULT_CSRF_PATH || '',
+    cryptoKeyPath: p.VAULT_CRYPTO_KEY_PATH || 'crypto/master',
  },
  cors: {
-    // No default — каждый деплой явно указывает CORS_ORIGINS, иначе пустой массив = нет cross-origin доступа.
-    origins: (p.CORS_ORIGINS || '').split(',').map((o) => o.trim()).filter(Boolean),
-    allowCredentials: p.CORS_ALLOW_CREDENTIALS !== 'false',
+    // Каждый деплой явно указывает CORS_ORIGINS, иначе пустой массив = нет cross-origin.
+    // Validate каждый origin через URL parse — отклоняем мусор. Default https-only для prod-safety.
+    origins: (p.CORS_ORIGINS || '')
+      .split(',')
+      .map((o) => o.trim())
+      .filter(Boolean)
+      .filter((o) => {
+        try {
+          const u = new URL(o);
+          return u.protocol === 'https:' || u.protocol === 'http:';
+        } catch {
+          return false;
+        }
+      }),
+    // Default = false (fail-secure). Чтобы включить credentials cross-origin —
+    // ОБЯЗАТЕЛЬНО явный CORS_ALLOW_CREDENTIALS=true.
+    allowCredentials: p.CORS_ALLOW_CREDENTIALS === 'true',
  },
  port: parseInt(p.API_PORT || '3001'),
  relayApiKey: p.RELAY_API_KEY || null,
--- a/apps/api/src/controllers/wallet.controller.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/controllers/wallet.controller.ts
@@ -1,15 +1,21 @@
 import { Request, Response } from 'express';
+import { db } from '../config/database';
 import { WalletModel } from '../models/wallet.model';
 import { UserModel } from '../models/user.model';
-import { getBalance, getTransactions, buildSend } from '../services/wallet-ops.service';
+import { getBalance, getTransactions } from '../services/wallet-ops.service';
 import { isValidAddress, isValidAmount, ChainCode } from '../lib/address-validators';
+import { generateMnemonic, deriveAllAddresses, ALL_CHAINS } from '../services/wallet-generator.service';
+import { encryptMnemonic, decryptMnemonic, isCryptoReady } from '../services/crypto.service';
+import { signAndBroadcast } from '../services/wallet-signer.service';
+import { auditLog, auditLogStrict } from '../lib/audit-log';
 import { logger } from '../lib/logger';

-const ALLOWED_CHAINS = new Set<ChainCode>(['ETH', 'BTC', 'SOL', 'TRX', 'BSC']);
-const MAX_WALLETS_PER_REQUEST = 20;
-const MAX_DERIVATION_PATH = 64;
+const ALLOWED_CHAINS = new Set<ChainCode>(ALL_CHAINS);
 const MAX_TX_LIMIT = 100;
-const BIP32_PATH_RE = /^m(\/[0-9]+'?)*$/;
+
+class ConflictError extends Error {
+  constructor() { super('Wallet already exists'); }
+}

 function isChain(value: unknown): value is ChainCode {
  return typeof value === 'string' && ALLOWED_CHAINS.has(value as ChainCode);
@@ -37,69 +43,153 @@ export const WalletController = {
  },

  /**
-   * POST /api/wallets/create — non-custodial upsert.
-   * Клиент сам деривит mnemonic и шлёт массив { chain, address, derivationPath }.
-   * Сервер валидирует и сохраняет (upsert по user_id+chain).
+   * POST /api/wallets/create — custodial bootstrap.
+   * Сервер: генерит mnemonic → деривит адреса 5 chains → шифрует AES-GCM (master из Vault)
+   *         → атомарно (UPDATE WHERE NULL + INSERT в одной транзакции) сохраняет
+   * Возвращает: ТОЛЬКО адреса. Mnemonic клиенту не отдаём.
   */
-  async createWallets(req: Request, res: Response) {
+  async createWallet(req: Request, res: Response) {
    const userId = req.auth!.userId;
-    const { wallets } = req.body ?? {};

-    if (!Array.isArray(wallets) || wallets.length === 0 || wallets.length > MAX_WALLETS_PER_REQUEST) {
+    if (!isCryptoReady()) {
+      res.status(503).json({ success: false, error: 'Crypto service not ready' });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    let mnemonic: string | null = null;
+    try {
+      await UserModel.ensureExists(userId);
+
+      if (await UserModel.hasMnemonic(userId)) {
+        res.status(409).json({ success: false, error: 'Wallet already exists' });
+        return;
+      }
+
+      mnemonic = generateMnemonic();
+      const derived = await deriveAllAddresses(mnemonic);
+      const blob = encryptMnemonic(mnemonic);
+
+      const created = await db.transaction(async (trx) => {
+        const claimed = await UserModel.setEncryptedMnemonicIfAbsent(userId, blob, trx);
+        if (!claimed) {
+          throw new ConflictError();
+        }
+        await WalletModel.createMany(
+          derived.map((w) => ({
+            user_id: userId,
+            chain: w.chain,
+            address: w.address,
+            derivation_path: w.derivationPath,
+          })),
+          trx,
+        );
+        return derived;
+      });
+
+      await auditLog({
+        event: 'wallet.create',
+        userId,
+        ip: req.ip || null,
+        result: 'success',
+        meta: { chains: created.map((w) => w.chain) },
+      });
+
+      res.status(201).json({
+        success: true,
+        data: created.map((w) => ({
+          chain: w.chain,
+          address: w.address,
+          derivationPath: w.derivationPath,
+        })),
+      });
+    } catch (err: any) {
+      if (err instanceof ConflictError) {
+        // Audit conflict events — surveillance attacker spamming the endpoint
+        await auditLog({
+          event: 'wallet.create',
+          userId,
+          ip: req.ip || null,
+          result: 'failure',
+          errorCode: 'CONFLICT',
+        });
+        res.status(409).json({ success: false, error: 'Wallet already exists' });
+        return;
+      }
+      logger.error(`createWallet failed for user ${userId}: ${err.stack || err.message}`);
+      await auditLog({
+        event: 'wallet.create',
+        userId,
+        ip: req.ip || null,
+        result: 'failure',
+        errorCode: 'INTERNAL',
+      });
+      res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Failed to create wallet' });
+    } finally {
+      mnemonic = null;
+    }
+  },
+
+  /**
+   * POST /api/wallets/mnemonic/reveal — settings: показать seed.
+   * Защита: POST + CSRF + body confirm token + rate-limit 5/час + audit-log.
+   */
+  async revealMnemonic(req: Request, res: Response) {
+    const userId = req.auth!.userId;
+
+    if (!isCryptoReady()) {
+      res.status(503).json({ success: false, error: 'Crypto service not ready' });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (req.body?.confirm !== 'I_UNDERSTAND_SEED_IS_SECRET') {
      res.status(400).json({
        success: false,
-        error: `wallets must be a non-empty array (max ${MAX_WALLETS_PER_REQUEST})`,
+        error: 'Missing or invalid confirm token. Send { "confirm": "I_UNDERSTAND_SEED_IS_SECRET" } in body.',
      });
      return;
    }

-    for (const w of wallets) {
-      if (!w || typeof w !== 'object') {
-        res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid wallet entry' });
-        return;
-      }
-      if (!isChain(w.chain)) {
-        res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid chain' });
-        return;
-      }
-      if (!isValidAddress(w.chain, w.address)) {
-        res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid address format for chain' });
-        return;
-      }
-      if (
-        typeof w.derivationPath !== 'string' ||
-        w.derivationPath.length === 0 ||
-        w.derivationPath.length > MAX_DERIVATION_PATH ||
-        !BIP32_PATH_RE.test(w.derivationPath)
-      ) {
-        res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid derivationPath (BIP32 m/.. format expected)' });
-        return;
-      }
-    }
-
    try {
-      await UserModel.ensureExists(userId);
+      const blob = await UserModel.getEncryptedMnemonic(userId);
+      if (!blob) {
+        await auditLog({
+          event: 'mnemonic.reveal',
+          userId,
+          ip: req.ip || null,
+          result: 'failure',
+          errorCode: 'NOT_FOUND',
+        });
+        res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Wallet not created yet' });
+        return;
+      }

-      const rows = await WalletModel.upsertMany(
-        wallets.map((w: { chain: ChainCode; address: string; derivationPath: string }) => ({
-          user_id: userId,
-          chain: w.chain,
-          address: w.address,
-          derivation_path: w.derivationPath,
-        })),
-      );
+      const mnemonic = decryptMnemonic(blob);

-      res.status(201).json({
-        success: true,
-        data: rows.map((w) => ({
-          chain: w.chain,
-          address: w.address,
-          derivationPath: w.derivation_path,
-        })),
-      });
+      // CRITICAL operation — fail-secure audit (если запись fail'ит — не отдаём mnemonic).
+      try {
+        await auditLogStrict({
+          event: 'mnemonic.reveal',
+          userId,
+          ip: req.ip || null,
+          result: 'success',
+        });
+      } catch (auditErr: any) {
+        logger.error(`Audit log MUST succeed for mnemonic.reveal: ${auditErr.message}`);
+        res.status(503).json({ success: false, error: 'Audit service unavailable' });
+        return;
+      }
+
+      res.json({ success: true, data: { mnemonic } });
    } catch (err: any) {
-      logger.error(`createWallets failed for user ${userId}: ${err.stack || err.message}`);
-      res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Internal error' });
+      logger.error(`revealMnemonic failed for user ${userId}: ${err.stack || err.message}`);
+      await auditLog({
+        event: 'mnemonic.reveal',
+        userId,
+        ip: req.ip || null,
+        result: 'failure',
+        errorCode: 'INTERNAL',
+      });
+      res.status(500).json({ success: false, error: 'Failed to reveal mnemonic' });
    }
  },

@@ -160,8 +250,9 @@ export const WalletController = {
  },

  /**
-   * POST /api/wallets/:chain/send — build unsigned tx (non-custodial).
-   * Возвращает unsigned tx; клиент подписывает приватом и broadcast'ит сам.
+   * POST /api/wallets/:chain/send — custodial sign + broadcast.
+   * Юзер жмёт "подтвердить" → клиент шлёт {to, amount, token?} → сервер расшифровывает
+   * мнемонику, деривит privkey, подписывает, broadcast'ит → возвращает txid.
   */
  async sendFromChain(req: Request, res: Response) {
    const userId = req.auth!.userId;
@@ -172,6 +263,11 @@ export const WalletController = {
      return;
    }

+    if (!isCryptoReady()) {
+      res.status(503).json({ success: false, error: 'Crypto service not ready' });
+      return;
+    }
+
    const { to, amount, token } = req.body ?? {};

    if (!isValidAddress(chain, String(to))) {
@@ -192,6 +288,7 @@ export const WalletController = {
      normalizedToken = token.toUpperCase();
    }

+    let mnemonic: string | null = null;
    try {
      const wallet = await WalletModel.findByUserAndChain(userId, chain);
      if (!wallet) {
@@ -199,21 +296,62 @@ export const WalletController = {
        return;
      }

-      const tx = await buildSend({
+      const blob = await UserModel.getEncryptedMnemonic(userId);
+      if (!blob) {
+        res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Encrypted mnemonic not found' });
+        return;
+      }
+
+      mnemonic = decryptMnemonic(blob);
+
+      const result = await signAndBroadcast({
        chain,
-        from: wallet.address,
+        mnemonic,
        to: String(to),
        amount: String(amount),
        token: normalizedToken,
+        expectedFromAddress: wallet.address,
      });

-      res.json({ success: true, data: tx });
+      // CRITICAL operation — fail-secure audit
+      try {
+        await auditLogStrict({
+          event: 'wallet.send',
+          userId,
+          ip: req.ip || null,
+          result: 'success',
+          meta: { chain, hasToken: !!normalizedToken, txid: result.txid },
+        });
+      } catch (auditErr: any) {
+        logger.error(`Audit log MUST succeed for wallet.send (txid=${result.txid}): ${auditErr.message}`);
+        // Tx уже broadcast'нут — нельзя отменить. Возвращаем txid но с warning о audit.
+        res.status(200).json({
+          success: true,
+          data: { txid: result.txid, chain },
+          warning: 'Transaction broadcast succeeded but audit log write failed',
+        });
+        return;
+      }
+
+      res.json({ success: true, data: { txid: result.txid, chain } });
    } catch (err: any) {
-      logger.error(`buildSend ${chain} failed for user ${userId}: ${err.stack || err.message}`);
-      const msg = err?.message?.toLowerCase?.().includes('not supported')
-        ? 'Token/chain combination not supported'
-        : 'Failed to build transaction';
+      logger.error(`send failed for user ${userId} chain ${chain}: ${err.stack || err.message}`);
+      await auditLog({
+        event: 'wallet.send',
+        userId,
+        ip: req.ip || null,
+        result: 'failure',
+        meta: { chain },
+        errorCode: 'BROADCAST_FAILED',
+      });
+      const msg = err?.message?.toLowerCase?.().includes('insufficient')
+        ? 'Insufficient balance'
+        : err?.message?.toLowerCase?.().includes('not supported')
+          ? 'Token/chain combination not supported'
+          : 'Failed to broadcast transaction';
      res.status(502).json({ success: false, error: msg });
+    } finally {
+      mnemonic = null;
    }
  },
 };
--- a/apps/api/src/index.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/index.ts
@@ -1,13 +1,31 @@
 import app from './app';
 import { env, initEnv } from './config/env';
 import { refreshAllKeys, startKeyRotation, stopKeyRotation } from './services/key-rotation.service';
+import { isCryptoReady } from './services/crypto.service';
 import { logger } from './lib/logger';

+// Global error handlers — иначе unhandled errors идут в stderr без sanitization (leak secrets)
+process.on('unhandledRejection', (reason: any) => {
+  logger.error(`Unhandled rejection: ${reason?.stack || reason?.message || reason}`);
+});
+process.on('uncaughtException', (err: Error) => {
+  logger.error(`Uncaught exception: ${err.stack || err.message}`);
+  // Process state could be corrupt — exit cleanly
+  process.exit(1);
+});
+
 async function main() {
  logger.info(`Wallet service instance started with id ${logger.instanceId}`);

  await initEnv();
  await refreshAllKeys();
+
+  // Custodial: без master-key сервис не может расшифровать ни одну мнемонику — fail fast.
+  if (!isCryptoReady()) {
+    logger.error('Crypto master key not loaded — refusing to start (custodial wallets require it)');
+    process.exit(1);
+  }
+
  startKeyRotation();

  const server = app.listen(env.port, () => {
--- a/apps/api/src/lib/audit-log.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/lib/audit-log.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/**
+ * Audit log — append-only JSON lines в `logs/audit.log`.
+ * Используется для критических custodial операций.
+ * НИКОГДА не логирует mnemonic / privkey / encrypted blob.
+ */
+
+import { promises as fs } from 'fs';
+import path from 'path';
+import { logger } from './logger';
+import { getTraceId } from './trace-store';
+
+const AUDIT_DIR = path.resolve(__dirname, '../../../../logs');
+const AUDIT_FILE = path.join(AUDIT_DIR, 'audit.log');
+
+let initialized = false;
+
+async function ensureFile(): Promise<void> {
+  if (initialized) return;
+  try {
+    await fs.mkdir(AUDIT_DIR, { recursive: true });
+    const handle = await fs.open(AUDIT_FILE, 'a', 0o600);
+    await handle.close();
+    try {
+      await fs.chmod(AUDIT_FILE, 0o600);
+    } catch {
+      // Windows chmod — игнор
+    }
+    initialized = true;
+  } catch (err: any) {
+    logger.error(`Audit log init failed: ${err.message}`);
+  }
+}
+
+export interface AuditEntry {
+  event: string;
+  userId: string;
+  ip?: string | null;
+  meta?: Record<string, unknown>;
+  result?: 'success' | 'failure';
+  errorCode?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Best-effort write. Если запись провалилась — только log, не throws.
+ * Используется для не-критических событий (wallet.create success, etc).
+ */
+export async function auditLog(entry: AuditEntry): Promise<void> {
+  await ensureFile();
+  const line = JSON.stringify({
+    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+    trace_id: getTraceId(),
+    ...entry,
+  });
+  try {
+    await fs.appendFile(AUDIT_FILE, line + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
+  } catch (err: any) {
+    logger.error(`Audit log write failed: ${err.message}`);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Fail-secure write. Если запись провалилась — throws.
+ * Используется для critical security событий (mnemonic.reveal, wallet.send),
+ * где compliance требует чтобы операция НЕ происходила без audit-trail.
+ */
+export async function auditLogStrict(entry: AuditEntry): Promise<void> {
+  await ensureFile();
+  const line = JSON.stringify({
+    timestamp: new Date().toISOString(),
+    trace_id: getTraceId(),
+    ...entry,
+  });
+  // Без try/catch — caller обрабатывает failure
+  await fs.appendFile(AUDIT_FILE, line + '\n', { mode: 0o600 });
+}
--- a/apps/api/src/lib/logger.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/lib/logger.ts
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@ function getCallerInfo(): { file: string; line: number } {
 const SENSITIVE_PATTERNS: { regex: RegExp; replace: string }[] = [
  { regex: /(password|passwd|pwd)\s*[:=]\s*\S+/gi, replace: '$1=***' },
  { regex: /(token|secret|api[_-]?key|auth)\s*[:=]\s*\S+/gi, replace: '$1=***' },
+  { regex: /(role[_-]?id|secret[_-]?id)\s*[:=]\s*\S+/gi, replace: '$1=***' },
  { regex: /(mnemonic|seed[_-]?phrase|private[_-]?key|priv[_-]?key)\s*[:=]\s*\S+/gi, replace: '$1=***' },
  { regex: /\bhvs\.[A-Za-z0-9]+/g, replace: 'hvs.***' },
  { regex: /\bs\.[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}/g, replace: 's.***' },
  { regex: /Bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._-]+/gi, replace: 'Bearer ***' },
  { regex: /Authorization:\s*\S+/gi, replace: 'Authorization: ***' },
-  // BIP39 mnemonic phrase (12+ lowercase английских слов через пробел) — рискованный паттерн,
-  // но лучше пере-санитайзить чем пропустить mnemonic в логи
-  { regex: /\b([a-z]{3,8}\s+){11,23}[a-z]{3,8}\b/g, replace: '[REDACTED_MNEMONIC]' },
+  // BIP39 mnemonic phrase (12-24 lowercase английских слов через пробел) — case-insensitive
+  { regex: /\b([a-z]{3,8}\s+){11,23}[a-z]{3,8}\b/gi, replace: '[REDACTED_MNEMONIC]' },
  // Hex privkey (64 hex chars подряд, optional 0x)
  { regex: /\b(0x)?[0-9a-fA-F]{64}\b/g, replace: '[REDACTED_HEX64]' },
 ];
--- a/apps/api/src/middleware/auth.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/middleware/auth.ts
@@ -35,7 +35,9 @@ export async function authMiddleware(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunc
    req.auth = await verifyAccessToken(token);
    next();
  } catch (err: any) {
+    // Лог детали server-side, клиенту — единое generic сообщение.
+    // Иначе err.message distinguishes "expired" vs "bad signature" vs "kid unknown" → info oracle.
    logger.warn(`Auth failed: ${err.message}`);
-    res.status(err.status || 401).json({ success: false, error: err.message || 'Invalid token' });
+    res.status(401).json({ success: false, error: 'Unauthorized' });
  }
 }
--- a/apps/api/src/middleware/csrf.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/middleware/csrf.ts
@@ -1,39 +1,61 @@
 import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
+import { timingSafeEqual } from 'crypto';
 import { verifyCsrfToken, isCsrfConfigured } from '../services/csrf.service';
 import { env } from '../config/env';
 import { logger } from '../lib/logger';

 const SAFE_METHODS = new Set(['GET', 'HEAD', 'OPTIONS']);

+/**
+ * CSRF middleware с double-submit pattern.
+ *
+ * Требует ОБА source'а: cookie `csrf_token` AND header `X-CSRF-Token`,
+ * сравнивает их constant-time. Без обоих или при несовпадении — 403.
+ *
+ * Защита: если attacker украл только cookie (auto-sent при cross-site POST),
+ * он не может выставить header X-CSRF-Token из чужого origin без CORS,
+ * а CORS у нас явный whitelist. Single-source check был bypass'able.
+ */
 export function csrfMiddleware(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void {
  if (SAFE_METHODS.has(req.method)) {
    next();
    return;
  }

-  // Если CSRF полностью отключён через ENV (csrfPath пустой) — пропускаем.
-  // Это явная конфигурация, не fail-open.
+  // CSRF полностью отключён через ENV (csrfPath пустой) — пропускаем явно.
  if (!env.vault.csrfPath) {
    next();
    return;
  }

-  // CSRF включён, но секрет не загружен (Vault недоступен) → fail-secure: 503.
-  // НИКОГДА не пропускаем mutating запросы при не-валидном состоянии.
+  // CSRF включён, но секрет не загружен → fail-secure 503.
  if (!isCsrfConfigured()) {
    logger.error('CSRF check unavailable: secret not loaded — rejecting mutating request');
    res.status(503).json({ success: false, error: 'CSRF protection unavailable, retry later' });
    return;
  }

-  const token = req.cookies?.csrf_token || req.headers['x-csrf-token'];
+  const cookieToken = req.cookies?.csrf_token;
+  const headerToken = req.headers['x-csrf-token'];

-  if (!token || typeof token !== 'string') {
-    res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'CSRF token missing' });
+  // Double-submit: ОБА обязательны.
+  if (!cookieToken || typeof cookieToken !== 'string' ||
+      !headerToken || typeof headerToken !== 'string') {
+    res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'CSRF token missing (need cookie + header)' });
    return;
  }

-  const result = verifyCsrfToken(token);
+  // Constant-time сравнение cookie === header (защита от timing oracle).
+  const a = Buffer.from(cookieToken);
+  const b = Buffer.from(headerToken);
+  if (a.length !== b.length || !timingSafeEqual(a, b)) {
+    logger.warn('CSRF: cookie/header mismatch');
+    res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'CSRF token mismatch' });
+    return;
+  }
+
+  // HMAC verify только после совпадения двух source'ов.
+  const result = verifyCsrfToken(cookieToken);
  if (!result.valid) {
    logger.warn(`CSRF validation failed: ${result.reason}`);
    res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid CSRF token' });
--- a/apps/api/src/middleware/rate-limit.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/middleware/rate-limit.ts
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ export const mutateLimiter = rateLimit({
  message: { success: false, error: 'Too many mutating requests' },
 });

-// Самый строгий — для send / wallet create (anti-abuse / spam tx prevention)
+// Самый строгий — для send / wallet create
 export const sensitiveLimiter = rateLimit({
  windowMs: 60 * 1000,
  limit: 10,
@@ -40,3 +40,13 @@ export const sensitiveLimiter = rateLimit({
  keyGenerator: keyByUserOrIp,
  message: { success: false, error: 'Too many sensitive requests' },
 });
+
+// Экстремально строгий — reveal seed phrase, 5/час
+export const mnemonicRevealLimiter = rateLimit({
+  windowMs: 60 * 60 * 1000,
+  limit: 5,
+  standardHeaders: 'draft-7',
+  legacyHeaders: false,
+  keyGenerator: keyByUserOrIp,
+  message: { success: false, error: 'Too many mnemonic reveal requests' },
+});
--- a/apps/api/src/middleware/trace.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/middleware/trace.ts
@@ -2,10 +2,15 @@ import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
 import { generateUlid } from '../utils/ulid';
 import { traceStore } from '../lib/trace-store';

+const TRACE_ID_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;
+
 export function traceMiddleware(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void {
-  const traceId = req.headers['x-trace-id'] as string
-    || req.headers['x-request-id'] as string
-    || generateUlid();
+  const supplied = (req.headers['x-trace-id'] || req.headers['x-request-id']) as string | undefined;
+
+  // Validate client-supplied trace-ID — иначе log injection / trace forgery
+  const traceId = (typeof supplied === 'string' && TRACE_ID_RE.test(supplied))
+    ? supplied
+    : generateUlid();

  res.setHeader('X-Trace-ID', traceId);

--- a/apps/api/src/models/session.model.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/models/session.model.ts
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-import { db } from '../config/database';
-import { generateUlid } from '../utils/ulid';
-
-export interface SessionRow {
-  id: string;
-  sid: string;
-  user_id: string;
-  device_id: string | null;
-  user_agent: string | null;
-  first_ip: string | null;
-  last_ip: string | null;
-  last_seen_at: Date | null;
-  revoked_at: Date | null;
-  refresh_jti_hash: string | null;
-  refresh_expires_at: Date | null;
-  created_at: Date;
-  updated_at: Date;
-}
-
-export const SessionModel = {
-  async findBySid(sid: string): Promise<SessionRow | undefined> {
-    return db('sessions').where({ sid }).whereNull('revoked_at').first();
-  },
-
-  async findByUserId(userId: string): Promise<SessionRow[]> {
-    return db('sessions').where({ user_id: userId }).whereNull('revoked_at');
-  },
-
-  async create(data: {
-    sid: string;
-    user_id: string;
-    device_id?: string;
-    user_agent?: string;
-    first_ip?: string;
-    refresh_jti_hash?: string;
-    refresh_expires_at?: Date;
-  }): Promise<SessionRow> {
-    const [session] = await db('sessions')
-      .insert({
-        id: generateUlid(),
-        ...data,
-        last_ip: data.first_ip || null,
-      })
-      .returning('*');
-    return session;
-  },
-
-  async revoke(sid: string): Promise<void> {
-    await db('sessions')
-      .where({ sid })
-      .update({ revoked_at: db.fn.now(), updated_at: db.fn.now() });
-  },
-
-  async revokeAllForUser(userId: string): Promise<void> {
-    await db('sessions')
-      .where({ user_id: userId })
-      .whereNull('revoked_at')
-      .update({ revoked_at: db.fn.now(), updated_at: db.fn.now() });
-  },
-
-  async updateLastSeen(sid: string, ip: string): Promise<void> {
-    await db('sessions')
-      .where({ sid })
-      .update({ last_seen_at: db.fn.now(), last_ip: ip, updated_at: db.fn.now() });
-  },
-};
--- a/apps/api/src/models/user.model.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/models/user.model.ts
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+import type { Knex } from 'knex';
 import { db } from '../config/database';

 export interface UserRow {
@@ -17,25 +18,44 @@ export interface UserRow {
  kyc_verified: boolean;
  kyc_verified_at: Date | null;
  is_deleted: boolean;
-  encrypted_vault: string | null;       // legacy, unused
-  vault_salt: string | null;            // legacy, unused
-  encrypted_mnemonic: string | null;    // legacy from custodial-experiment, unused
+  encrypted_vault: string | null;     // legacy, unused
+  vault_salt: string | null;          // legacy, unused
+  encrypted_mnemonic: string | null;  // AES-GCM blob (custodial)
  created_at: Date;
  updated_at: Date;
 }

-export const UserModel = {
-  async findById(id: string): Promise<UserRow | undefined> {
-    return db('users').where({ id, is_deleted: false }).first();
-  },
+// Public-safe subset, без encrypted_* / password_hash.
+// Используется когда results могут попасть в response.
+const PUBLIC_USER_COLUMNS = [
+  'id',
+  'email',
+  'last_name',
+  'first_name',
+  'middle_name',
+  'birth_date',
+  'phone',
+  'kyc_verified',
+  'kyc_verified_at',
+  'is_deleted',
+  'created_at',
+  'updated_at',
+] as const;

-  async findByEmail(email: string): Promise<UserRow | undefined> {
-    return db('users').where({ email, is_deleted: false }).first();
+export const UserModel = {
+  /**
+   * Public-safe lookup. НЕ возвращает encrypted_* / password_hash.
+   */
+  async findById(id: string) {
+    return db('users')
+      .where({ id, is_deleted: false })
+      .select(...PUBLIC_USER_COLUMNS)
+      .first();
  },

  /**
   * Создать запись пользователя если её нет.
-   * id берётся из JWT (sub). Email/password_hash — заглушки, реальная auth у BITOK.
+   * id — из JWT.sub (валидируется на JWT verify).
   */
  async ensureExists(id: string): Promise<void> {
    await db('users')
@@ -48,14 +68,36 @@ export const UserModel = {
      .ignore();
  },

-  async update(
-    id: string,
-    data: Partial<Omit<UserRow, 'id' | 'created_at'>>,
-  ): Promise<UserRow | undefined> {
-    const [user] = await db('users')
-      .where({ id })
-      .update({ ...data, updated_at: db.fn.now() })
-      .returning('*');
-    return user;
+  /**
+   * Set-once: возвращает true только если этот вызов реально занял slot.
+   * Защита от race: два параллельных createWallet не могут оба перезаписать.
+   * Также filter is_deleted=false — не давать zombie-account resurrection.
+   */
+  async setEncryptedMnemonicIfAbsent(id: string, blob: string, trx?: Knex.Transaction): Promise<boolean> {
+    const k = trx || db;
+    const affected = await k('users')
+      .where({ id, is_deleted: false })
+      .whereNull('encrypted_mnemonic')
+      .update({
+        encrypted_mnemonic: blob,
+        updated_at: k.fn.now(),
+      });
+    return affected === 1;
+  },
+
+  async getEncryptedMnemonic(id: string): Promise<string | null> {
+    const row = await db('users')
+      .where({ id, is_deleted: false })
+      .select('encrypted_mnemonic')
+      .first();
+    return row?.encrypted_mnemonic ?? null;
+  },
+
+  async hasMnemonic(id: string): Promise<boolean> {
+    const row = await db('users')
+      .where({ id, is_deleted: false })
+      .select(db.raw('encrypted_mnemonic IS NOT NULL AS has'))
+      .first();
+    return Boolean(row?.has);
  },
 };
--- a/apps/api/src/models/wallet.model.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/models/wallet.model.ts
@@ -20,6 +20,12 @@ export const WalletModel = {
    return db('wallets').where({ user_id: userId, chain }).first();
  },

+  /**
+   * Insert wallets. UNIQUE(user_id, chain) на уровне DB предотвращает дубликаты —
+   * на конфликт kicks transaction rollback.
+   * Используется только из createWallet (custodial bootstrap, one-shot per user).
+   * НЕ используем upsertMany — нет легитимного пути менять адрес после генерации.
+   */
  async createMany(
    wallets: { user_id: string; chain: string; address: string; derivation_path: string }[],
    trx?: Knex.Transaction,
@@ -27,19 +33,4 @@ export const WalletModel = {
    const withIds = wallets.map((w) => ({ id: generateUlid(), ...w }));
    return (trx || db)('wallets').insert(withIds).returning('*');
  },
-
-  /**
-   * Insert wallets, on conflict (user_id, chain) update address + derivation_path.
-   * Used by POST /api/wallets — клиент шлёт массив адресов после регистрации в BITOK.
-   */
-  async upsertMany(
-    wallets: { user_id: string; chain: string; address: string; derivation_path: string }[]
-  ): Promise<WalletRow[]> {
-    const withIds = wallets.map((w) => ({ id: generateUlid(), ...w }));
-    return db('wallets')
-      .insert(withIds)
-      .onConflict(['user_id', 'chain'])
-      .merge(['address', 'derivation_path'])
-      .returning('*');
-  },
 };
--- a/apps/api/src/routes/bsc-swap-proxy.routes.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/routes/bsc-swap-proxy.routes.ts
@@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ async function getSwapQuote(req: Request, res: Response) {
      toDecimals: TOKEN_DECIMALS[to],
    });
  } catch (error) {
-    const msg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Failed to get BSC swap quote';
-    res.status(502).json({ success: false, error: msg });
+    console.error(`BSC quote failed: ${(error as any)?.stack || (error as any)?.message}`);
+    res.status(502).json({ success: false, error: 'Failed to get BSC swap quote' });
  }
 }

@@ -113,6 +113,18 @@ async function buildSwapTx(req: Request, res: Response) {
    return;
  }

+  // Validate amount + amountOutMin: positive integers > 0 (string-encoded BigInt).
+  // "0" truthy bypass — без этого attacker может выставить amountOutMin=0 = 100% slippage
+  // → sandwich attack осушает swap.
+  if (!/^\d+$/.test(String(amount)) || BigInt(amount) <= 0n) {
+    res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid amount (must be positive integer string)' });
+    return;
+  }
+  if (!/^\d+$/.test(String(amountOutMin)) || BigInt(amountOutMin) <= 0n) {
+    res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid amountOutMin (must be positive; 0 = unlimited slippage)' });
+    return;
+  }
+
  try {
    const provider = new ethers.providers.StaticJsonRpcProvider(BSC_RPC, BSC_CHAIN_ID);
    const routerContract = new ethers.Contract(PANCAKE_ROUTER, ROUTER_ABI, provider);
@@ -145,10 +157,12 @@ async function buildSwapTx(req: Request, res: Response) {
      );

      if (currentAllowance.lt(ethers.BigNumber.from(amount))) {
-        // Build approve tx
+        // Exact-amount approve (НЕ MaxUint256!). Infinite approval = post-tx attack vector:
+        // если router compromised или attacker узнаёт private key позже, attacker дренит
+        // всё что approved. Approve только то что нужно сейчас.
        const approveData = tokenContract.interface.encodeFunctionData(
          'approve',
-          [PANCAKE_ROUTER, ethers.constants.MaxUint256]
+          [PANCAKE_ROUTER, amount]
        );

        transactions.push({
@@ -175,8 +189,8 @@ async function buildSwapTx(req: Request, res: Response) {

    res.json({ success: true, transactions });
  } catch (error) {
-    const msg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Failed to build BSC swap';
-    res.status(502).json({ success: false, error: msg });
+    console.error(`BSC build failed: ${(error as any)?.stack || (error as any)?.message}`);
+    res.status(502).json({ success: false, error: 'Failed to build BSC swap' });
  }
 }

--- a/apps/api/src/routes/btc-proxy.routes.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/routes/btc-proxy.routes.ts
@@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ async function getFeeEstimates(_req: Request, res: Response) {
 async function broadcastTx(req: Request, res: Response) {
  const { hex } = req.body;

-  if (!hex || typeof hex !== 'string' || !/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(hex)) {
+  // BTC max tx serialized ~100KB = 200_000 hex chars. Cap чтобы не abuse'или bandwidth.
+  if (!hex || typeof hex !== 'string' || !/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(hex) || hex.length > 200_000) {
    res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid transaction hex' });
    return;
  }
@@ -130,7 +131,8 @@ async function broadcastTx(req: Request, res: Response) {
    const text = await response.text();

    if (!response.ok) {
-      res.status(response.status).json({ success: false, error: text || 'Broadcast failed' });
+      // Don't leak Blockstream error body (could contain UTXO state oracle).
+      res.status(502).json({ success: false, error: 'BTC broadcast failed' });
      return;
    }

--- a/apps/api/src/routes/relay-proxy.routes.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/routes/relay-proxy.routes.ts
@@ -1,9 +1,19 @@
 import { NextFunction, Request, Response, Router } from 'express';
 import { env } from '../config/env';
+import { logger } from '../lib/logger';

 const router = Router();
 const RELAY_API_URL = 'https://api.relay.link';
-const ALLOWED_PATHS = new Set(['/quote/v2', '/intents/status/v3']);
+const RELAY_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000;
+
+// Whitelist: GET-paths + allowed `/execute/<action>` actions.
+// Без него `req.path` после `/execute/` свободен → `/execute/../admin` обходит startsWith-check.
+const ALLOWED_GET_PATHS = new Set(['/quote/v2', '/intents/status/v3']);
+const ALLOWED_EXECUTE_ACTIONS = new Set([
+  'swap',
+  'bridge',
+  // добавлять по мере необходимости
+]);

 router.use(proxyRelayRequest);

@@ -12,7 +22,19 @@ export default router;
 async function proxyRelayRequest(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) {
  try {
    const relayPath = req.path;
-    if (!relayPath.startsWith('/execute/') && !ALLOWED_PATHS.has(relayPath)) {
+
+    // Whitelist matching — никакого freeform после `/execute/`.
+    let allowed = false;
+    if (ALLOWED_GET_PATHS.has(relayPath)) {
+      allowed = true;
+    } else if (relayPath.startsWith('/execute/')) {
+      const action = relayPath.slice('/execute/'.length);
+      // action: только alphanumeric, никаких слешей/дотов
+      if (/^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,32}$/i.test(action) && ALLOWED_EXECUTE_ACTIONS.has(action)) {
+        allowed = true;
+      }
+    }
+    if (!allowed) {
      res.status(404).json({ success: false, error: 'Relay endpoint not allowed' });
      return;
    }
@@ -24,29 +46,55 @@ async function proxyRelayRequest(req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction
        value.forEach((item) => relayUrl.searchParams.append(key, String(item)));
        return;
      }
-
      if (typeof value !== 'undefined') {
        relayUrl.searchParams.set(key, String(value));
      }
    });

-    const response = await fetch(relayUrl.toString(), {
-      method: req.method,
-      headers: {
-        Accept: 'application/json',
-        ...(req.method !== 'GET' ? { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } : {}),
-        ...(env.relayApiKey ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${env.relayApiKey}` } : {}),
-      },
-      body: req.method === 'GET' ? undefined : JSON.stringify(req.body ?? {}),
-    });
+    // Explicit timeout via AbortController — иначе hang upstream'а держит request indefinitely.
+    const controller = new AbortController();
+    const t = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), RELAY_TIMEOUT_MS);

-    const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? 'application/json';
-    const payload = await response.text();
+    let upstream: globalThis.Response;
+    try {
+      upstream = await fetch(relayUrl.toString(), {
+        method: req.method,
+        headers: {
+          Accept: 'application/json',
+          ...(req.method !== 'GET' ? { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' } : {}),
+          ...(env.relayApiKey ? { Authorization: `Bearer ${env.relayApiKey}` } : {}),
+        },
+        body: req.method === 'GET' ? undefined : JSON.stringify(req.body ?? {}),
+        signal: controller.signal,
+      });
+    } finally {
+      clearTimeout(t);
+    }

-    res.status(response.status);
-    res.type(contentType);
-    res.send(payload);
-  } catch (error) {
-    next(error);
+    // Force JSON content-type — иначе compromised upstream может вернуть text/html
+    // → reflected XSS если frontend рендерит ответ напрямую.
+    res.status(upstream.status);
+    res.type('application/json');
+
+    const text = await upstream.text();
+    if (!upstream.ok) {
+      logger.warn(`Relay upstream ${upstream.status}: ${text.slice(0, 200)}`);
+      res.json({ success: false, error: 'Relay upstream error' });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // Send raw text если это валидный JSON, иначе обернём
+    try {
+      res.send(text);
+    } catch {
+      res.json({ success: false, error: 'Relay returned non-JSON' });
+    }
+  } catch (error: any) {
+    if (error?.name === 'AbortError') {
+      res.status(504).json({ success: false, error: 'Relay request timeout' });
+      return;
+    }
+    logger.error(`Relay proxy failed: ${error?.stack || error?.message}`);
+    res.status(502).json({ success: false, error: 'Relay proxy error' });
  }
 }
--- a/apps/api/src/routes/sol-swap-proxy.routes.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/routes/sol-swap-proxy.routes.ts
@@ -85,8 +85,10 @@ async function getQuote(req: Request, res: Response) {
    const response = await fetch(url.toString(), { headers, signal: controller.signal });

    if (!response.ok) {
-      const text = await response.text().catch(() => 'Unknown error');
-      res.status(response.status).json({ success: false, error: `Jupiter API error: ${text}` });
+      const text = await response.text().catch(() => '');
+      // НЕ reflect'им upstream body — может содержать internal config (feeAccount, refs)
+      console.error(`Jupiter quote ${response.status}: ${text.slice(0, 200)}`);
+      res.status(502).json({ success: false, error: 'Jupiter upstream error' });
      return;
    }

@@ -153,8 +155,9 @@ async function buildSwap(req: Request, res: Response) {
    });

    if (!response.ok) {
-      const text = await response.text().catch(() => 'Unknown error');
-      res.status(response.status).json({ success: false, error: `Jupiter swap build error: ${text}` });
+      const text = await response.text().catch(() => '');
+      console.error(`Jupiter swap build ${response.status}: ${text.slice(0, 200)}`);
+      res.status(502).json({ success: false, error: 'Jupiter upstream error' });
      return;
    }

--- a/apps/api/src/routes/tron-proxy.routes.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/routes/tron-proxy.routes.ts
@@ -219,6 +219,10 @@ const ALLOWED_TRC_FUNCTIONS = new Set<string>([
 * Proxies to TronGrid /wallet/triggersmartcontract — builds unsigned transaction.
 * Whitelisted contracts + function selectors only.
 */
+// Максимальный fee_limit для TriggerSmartContract: 1000 TRX = 1_000_000_000 sun.
+// Без этого attacker с whitelist-проходящим контрактом мог бы выкачать ресурсы аккаунта.
+const MAX_FEE_LIMIT_SUN = 1_000_000_000;
+
 async function triggerSmartContract(req: Request, res: Response) {
  const controller = new AbortController();
  const timeout = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), TRON_TIMEOUT_MS);
@@ -228,6 +232,9 @@ async function triggerSmartContract(req: Request, res: Response) {
    const contractAddress = String(body.contract_address || '');
    const functionSelector = String(body.function_selector || '');
    const ownerAddress = String(body.owner_address || '');
+    const parameter = String(body.parameter || '');
+    const callValueRaw = body.call_value;
+    const feeLimitRaw = body.fee_limit;

    if (!ALLOWED_TRC_CONTRACTS.has(contractAddress)) {
      res.status(403).json({ success: false, error: 'Contract address not allowed' });
@@ -242,6 +249,29 @@ async function triggerSmartContract(req: Request, res: Response) {
      return;
    }

+    // Validate parameter — hex (0-9a-f), без 0x prefix, length определена selector'ом.
+    if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]*$/.test(parameter)) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid parameter (must be hex)' });
+      return;
+    }
+    // Лимит длины — самый длинный whitelist'нутый ABI принимает ~3-4 параметра = 256-512 hex chars
+    if (parameter.length > 1024) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'parameter too long' });
+      return;
+    }
+
+    // Bound fee_limit + call_value
+    const feeLimit = Number(feeLimitRaw ?? 0);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(feeLimit) || feeLimit < 0 || feeLimit > MAX_FEE_LIMIT_SUN) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: `fee_limit out of bounds (max ${MAX_FEE_LIMIT_SUN})` });
+      return;
+    }
+    const callValue = Number(callValueRaw ?? 0);
+    if (!Number.isFinite(callValue) || callValue < 0) {
+      res.status(400).json({ success: false, error: 'Invalid call_value' });
+      return;
+    }
+
    const headers: Record<string, string> = {
      'Content-Type': 'application/json',
      Accept: 'application/json',
@@ -250,11 +280,22 @@ async function triggerSmartContract(req: Request, res: Response) {
      headers['TRON-PRO-API-KEY'] = env.tronApiKey;
    }

+    // ВАЖНО: НЕ forward'им req.body целиком — только validated fields.
+    const forwardBody = {
+      owner_address: ownerAddress,
+      contract_address: contractAddress,
+      function_selector: functionSelector,
+      parameter,
+      fee_limit: feeLimit,
+      call_value: callValue,
+      visible: true,
+    };
+
    const response = await fetch(`${TRONGRID_BASE}/wallet/triggersmartcontract`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers,
      signal: controller.signal,
-      body: JSON.stringify(req.body),
+      body: JSON.stringify(forwardBody),
    });

    const data = await response.json();
--- a/apps/api/src/routes/tron-swap-proxy.routes.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/routes/tron-swap-proxy.routes.ts
@@ -308,8 +308,8 @@ async function buildSwapTx(req: Request, res: Response) {
      res.status(504).json({ success: false, error: 'Build request timed out' });
      return;
    }
-    const msg = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'Failed to build swap';
-    res.status(502).json({ success: false, error: msg });
+    console.error(`TRON swap build failed: ${(error as any)?.stack || (error as any)?.message}`);
+    res.status(502).json({ success: false, error: 'Failed to build swap' });
  } finally {
    clearTimeout(timeout);
  }
--- a/apps/api/src/routes/wallet.routes.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/routes/wallet.routes.ts
@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@ import { WalletController } from '../controllers/wallet.controller';

 const router = Router();

+router.post('/create', WalletController.createWallet);
 router.get('/', WalletController.getWallets);
-router.post('/create', WalletController.createWallets);
+router.post('/mnemonic/reveal', WalletController.revealMnemonic);

 router.get('/:chain/balance', WalletController.getChainBalance);
 router.get('/:chain/transactions', WalletController.getChainTransactions);
--- a/apps/api/src/services/crypto.service.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/services/crypto.service.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+import { randomBytes, createCipheriv, createDecipheriv } from 'crypto';
+import { fetchVaultKV2 } from '../config/vault';
+
+/**
+ * Symmetric encryption (AES-256-GCM) для хранения мнемоник юзеров.
+ * Master-key читается из Vault при старте.
+ *
+ * Storage layout (base64):  IV(12) || ciphertext(N) || authTag(16)
+ *
+ * Ключ — 32 байта (256 бит), храним в Buffer, нигде на диск не пишем.
+ * Если ключ не загружен — encrypt/decrypt бросают ошибку (fail-secure).
+ */
+
+const KEY_LEN = 32;
+const IV_LEN = 12;
+const TAG_LEN = 16;
+
+let masterKey: Buffer | null = null;
+
+/**
+ * Установить master-key (вызывается ОДНОКРАТНО при первом старте).
+ * Повторная установка после успешной загрузки запрещена (это бы убило все
+ * существующие encrypted_mnemonic).
+ */
+export function swapMasterKey(newKey: Buffer): void {
+  if (!newKey || newKey.length !== KEY_LEN) {
+    throw new Error(`swapMasterKey: invalid key (expected ${KEY_LEN} bytes)`);
+  }
+  if (masterKey) {
+    throw new Error('swapMasterKey: master key already loaded; rotation is not supported');
+  }
+  masterKey = newKey;
+}
+
+export function masterKeyMatches(candidate: Buffer): boolean {
+  if (!masterKey || !candidate || candidate.length !== KEY_LEN) return false;
+  return masterKey.equals(candidate);
+}
+
+export function isCryptoReady(): boolean {
+  return masterKey !== null && masterKey.length === KEY_LEN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Pre-fetch master-key из Vault. НЕ мутирует глобал — возвращает Buffer.
+ * Throws при отсутствии или невалидном формате.
+ */
+export async function fetchMasterKey(
+  addr: string,
+  token: string,
+  mount: string,
+  path: string,
+): Promise<Buffer> {
+  const secrets = await fetchVaultKV2(addr, token, mount, path);
+  if (!secrets) {
+    throw new Error('Failed to load crypto master key from Vault');
+  }
+
+  const raw = secrets.key || secrets.master_key || secrets.MASTER_KEY;
+  if (!raw || typeof raw !== 'string') {
+    throw new Error('Crypto master key invalid: expected hex string in Vault field "key"');
+  }
+  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/.test(raw)) {
+    throw new Error('Crypto master key invalid: must be 64-char hex (32 bytes)');
+  }
+
+  const buf = Buffer.from(raw, 'hex');
+  if (buf.length !== KEY_LEN) {
+    throw new Error(`Crypto master key invalid: got ${buf.length} bytes, expected ${KEY_LEN}`);
+  }
+  return buf;
+}
+
+export function encryptMnemonic(plaintext: string): string {
+  if (!masterKey) {
+    throw new Error('Crypto service not ready');
+  }
+  if (typeof plaintext !== 'string' || plaintext.length === 0) {
+    throw new Error('encryptMnemonic: plaintext must be non-empty string');
+  }
+
+  const iv = randomBytes(IV_LEN);
+  const cipher = createCipheriv('aes-256-gcm', masterKey, iv);
+  const ct = Buffer.concat([cipher.update(plaintext, 'utf8'), cipher.final()]);
+  const tag = cipher.getAuthTag();
+
+  return Buffer.concat([iv, ct, tag]).toString('base64');
+}
+
+export function decryptMnemonic(blob: string): string {
+  if (!masterKey) {
+    throw new Error('Crypto service not ready');
+  }
+  if (typeof blob !== 'string' || blob.length === 0) {
+    throw new Error('decryptMnemonic: blob must be non-empty string');
+  }
+
+  const buf = Buffer.from(blob, 'base64');
+  if (buf.length < IV_LEN + TAG_LEN + 1) {
+    throw new Error('decryptMnemonic: blob too short');
+  }
+
+  const iv = buf.subarray(0, IV_LEN);
+  const tag = buf.subarray(buf.length - TAG_LEN);
+  const ct = buf.subarray(IV_LEN, buf.length - TAG_LEN);
+
+  const decipher = createDecipheriv('aes-256-gcm', masterKey, iv);
+  decipher.setAuthTag(tag);
+
+  try {
+    return Buffer.concat([decipher.update(ct), decipher.final()]).toString('utf8');
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error('decryptMnemonic: authentication failed');
+  }
+}
--- a/apps/api/src/services/csrf.service.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/services/csrf.service.ts
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ const ITSDANGEROUS_EPOCH = 1293840000; // 2011-01-01 UTC in unix time
 export interface CsrfConfig {
  secret: string;
  salt: string;
-  digest: 'sha1' | 'sha256' | 'sha512';
+  digest: 'sha256' | 'sha512';
  maxAgeSec: number;
 }

@@ -61,8 +61,9 @@ export async function fetchCsrfConfig(
    throw new Error('CSRF salt invalid: must be string >= 8 chars');
  }

-  let digest: 'sha1' | 'sha256' | 'sha512' = 'sha512';
-  if (secrets.digest === 'sha1' || secrets.digest === 'sha256' || secrets.digest === 'sha512') {
+  // sha1 deprecated — accept только sha256/sha512.
+  let digest: 'sha256' | 'sha512' = 'sha512';
+  if (secrets.digest === 'sha256' || secrets.digest === 'sha512') {
    digest = secrets.digest;
  }

@@ -87,8 +88,10 @@ function deriveKey(secret: string, salt: string, digest: string): Buffer {

 function decodeTimestamp(encoded: string): number {
  const raw = b64urlDecode(encoded);
+  // Использовать арифметику вместо bitwise — bitwise overflowит на 32-bit signed
+  // после 2038 если timestamp encoding станет 5-байтным.
  let ts = 0;
-  for (const b of raw) ts = (ts << 8) | b;
+  for (const b of raw) ts = ts * 256 + b;
  return ts + ITSDANGEROUS_EPOCH;
 }

--- a/apps/api/src/services/jwt.service.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/services/jwt.service.ts
@@ -127,8 +127,13 @@ export async function verifyAccessToken(token: string): Promise<AuthContext> {
    throw Object.assign(new Error('Invalid token type'), { status: 401 });
  }

-  if (!payload.sub || !payload.sid) {
-    throw Object.assign(new Error('Missing token claims'), { status: 401 });
+  // Строгая валидация sub/sid — иначе number/__proto__/10MB строки попадают в PG / в req.auth.
+  const SUB_RE = /^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{1,64}$/;
+  if (typeof payload.sub !== 'string' || !SUB_RE.test(payload.sub)) {
+    throw Object.assign(new Error('Invalid sub claim'), { status: 401 });
+  }
+  if (typeof payload.sid !== 'string' || !SUB_RE.test(payload.sid)) {
+    throw Object.assign(new Error('Invalid sid claim'), { status: 401 });
  }

  return {
--- a/apps/api/src/services/key-rotation.service.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/services/key-rotation.service.ts
@@ -2,27 +2,40 @@ import { env, getVaultToken } from '../config/env';
 import { vaultAppRoleLogin } from '../config/vault';
 import { fetchJwtKeysFromVault, swapKeyMap, getKeyMapSize } from './jwt.service';
 import { fetchCsrfConfig, swapCsrfConfig } from './csrf.service';
+import { fetchMasterKey, swapMasterKey, masterKeyMatches, isCryptoReady } from './crypto.service';
 import { logger } from '../lib/logger';

 const DEFAULT_INTERVAL_MS = 60 * 60 * 1000; // 1 hour

 let timer: NodeJS.Timeout | null = null;
-let currentVaultToken: string | null = null;
+
+// Inflight guard — reentrant calls share the same promise (audit#4 C2/C3).
+// Без этого две параллельные refreshAllKeys могут torn-state'ить keyMap/csrf/crypto.
+let inflight: Promise<void> | null = null;

 /**
- * Atomic refresh: pre-fetch JWT keys + CSRF config, swap globals only if BOTH succeed.
- * При любой ошибке оставляем старые значения в памяти, сервис продолжает работать.
+ * Atomic refresh: pre-fetch JWT/CSRF/crypto secrets, swap globals только если необходимые получены.
+ * Reentrant-safe.
 */
 export async function refreshAllKeys(): Promise<void> {
-  const { addr, roleId, secretId, mount, jwtKidPath, jwtKidsPrefix, csrfPath } = env.vault;
+  if (inflight) return inflight;
+  inflight = doRefresh().finally(() => {
+    inflight = null;
+  });
+  return inflight;
+}
+
+async function doRefresh(): Promise<void> {
+  const { addr, roleId, secretId, mount, jwtKidPath, jwtKidsPrefix, csrfPath, cryptoKeyPath } = env.vault;

  if (!addr || !roleId || !secretId) {
    logger.warn('Vault not configured, skipping key refresh');
    return;
  }

-  // Vault token: используем закэшированный из initEnv, либо логинимся заново
-  let token = currentVaultToken || getVaultToken();
+  // Каждый refresh — свежий Vault token. Старый optimisation с `currentVaultToken`
+  // был dead code (синхронный reset перед использованием).
+  let token = getVaultToken();
  if (!token) {
    const fresh = await vaultAppRoleLogin(addr, roleId, secretId);
    if (!fresh) {
@@ -30,16 +43,14 @@ export async function refreshAllKeys(): Promise<void> {
      return;
    }
    token = fresh;
-    currentVaultToken = fresh;
  }

-  // ── Pre-fetch обоих секретов параллельно (НЕ мутируя глобал) ───────────
  const jwtPromise = fetchJwtKeysFromVault(addr, token, mount, jwtKidPath, jwtKidsPrefix);
  const csrfPromise = csrfPath ? fetchCsrfConfig(addr, token, mount, csrfPath) : Promise.resolve(null);
+  const cryptoPromise = cryptoKeyPath ? fetchMasterKey(addr, token, mount, cryptoKeyPath) : Promise.resolve(null);

-  const [jwtResult, csrfResult] = await Promise.allSettled([jwtPromise, csrfPromise]);
+  const [jwtResult, csrfResult, cryptoResult] = await Promise.allSettled([jwtPromise, csrfPromise, cryptoPromise]);

-  // ── Атомарность: если хоть один обязательный fetch упал — НИЧЕГО не меняем ──
  if (jwtResult.status === 'rejected') {
    logger.error(`Key refresh ABORTED — JWT keys fetch failed: ${jwtResult.reason?.message || jwtResult.reason}`);
    return;
@@ -48,16 +59,34 @@ export async function refreshAllKeys(): Promise<void> {
    logger.error(`Key refresh ABORTED — CSRF fetch failed: ${csrfResult.reason?.message || csrfResult.reason}`);
    return;
  }
+  // Master-key: первый load обязателен, дальнейшие failures толерантны.
+  if (cryptoKeyPath && !isCryptoReady() && cryptoResult.status === 'rejected') {
+    logger.error(`Key refresh ABORTED — Crypto master key fetch failed: ${cryptoResult.reason?.message || cryptoResult.reason}`);
+    return;
+  }

-  // ── Atomic swap (синхронные операции, нельзя прервать) ──────────────────
+  // Atomic synchronous swap. JS single-threaded — между swap'ами нет await,
+  // т.е. observers видят либо все старые, либо все новые значения.
  swapKeyMap(jwtResult.value);
  if (csrfResult.status === 'fulfilled' && csrfResult.value) {
    swapCsrfConfig(csrfResult.value);
  }
+  if (cryptoResult.status === 'fulfilled' && cryptoResult.value) {
+    if (!isCryptoReady()) {
+      swapMasterKey(cryptoResult.value);
+      logger.info('Crypto master key loaded');
+    } else if (!masterKeyMatches(cryptoResult.value)) {
+      logger.warn(
+        'Vault crypto/master key DIFFERS from in-memory key. Service continues with old key. ' +
+        'Rotating master-key bricks all existing encrypted_mnemonic — revert Vault or plan re-encryption migration.'
+      );
+    }
+  }

  logger.info(
    `Keys refreshed atomically: JWT keys=${getKeyMapSize()}` +
-    (csrfPath ? `, CSRF=${csrfResult.status === 'fulfilled' ? 'updated' : 'unchanged'}` : '')
+    (csrfPath ? `, CSRF=${csrfResult.status === 'fulfilled' ? 'updated' : 'unchanged'}` : '') +
+    `, Crypto=${isCryptoReady() ? 'ready' : 'NOT-READY'}`
  );
 }

@@ -68,8 +97,6 @@ export function startKeyRotation(intervalMs: number = DEFAULT_INTERVAL_MS): void
    void refreshAllKeys().catch((err) =>
      logger.error(`Key rotation tick failed: ${err?.message || err}`)
    );
-    // На каждый тик — invalidate Vault token (он мог истечь), будет re-login
-    currentVaultToken = null;
  }, intervalMs);
  logger.info(`Key rotation scheduled (every ${intervalMs}ms)`);
 }
--- a/apps/api/src/services/wallet-generator.service.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/services/wallet-generator.service.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/**
+ * Wallet generation: BIP39 mnemonic + multi-chain address derivation.
+ * Server-side для custodial-флоу.
+ */
+
+import { ethers } from 'ethers';
+import { createHash } from 'crypto';
+import bs58 from 'bs58';
+import * as bip39 from 'bip39';
+import { BIP32Factory } from 'bip32';
+import * as ecc from 'tiny-secp256k1';
+import * as bitcoin from 'bitcoinjs-lib';
+import { Keypair } from '@solana/web3.js';
+import { derivePath } from 'ed25519-hd-key';
+import type { ChainCode } from '../lib/address-validators';
+
+const bip32 = BIP32Factory(ecc);
+
+export const DERIVATION_PATHS: Record<ChainCode, string> = {
+  ETH: "m/44'/60'/0'/0/0",
+  BSC: "m/44'/60'/0'/0/0",
+  BTC: "m/84'/0'/0'/0/0",
+  TRX: "m/44'/195'/0'/0/0",
+  SOL: "m/44'/501'/0'/0'",
+};
+
+export const ALL_CHAINS: ChainCode[] = ['ETH', 'BSC', 'BTC', 'TRX', 'SOL'];
+
+export interface DerivedWallet {
+  chain: ChainCode;
+  address: string;
+  derivationPath: string;
+}
+
+export function generateMnemonic(): string {
+  return bip39.generateMnemonic(128);
+}
+
+export function validateMnemonic(m: string): boolean {
+  return bip39.validateMnemonic(m);
+}
+
+export async function deriveAllAddresses(mnemonic: string): Promise<DerivedWallet[]> {
+  if (!bip39.validateMnemonic(mnemonic)) {
+    throw new Error('Invalid mnemonic');
+  }
+
+  const seed = await bip39.mnemonicToSeed(mnemonic);
+  const seedHex = seed.toString('hex');
+
+  // ETH (BSC shares)
+  const ethWallet = ethers.Wallet.fromMnemonic(mnemonic, DERIVATION_PATHS.ETH);
+  const ethAddress = ethers.utils.getAddress(ethWallet.address);
+
+  // BTC P2WPKH bech32
+  const btcRoot = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
+  const btcChild = btcRoot.derivePath(DERIVATION_PATHS.BTC);
+  if (!btcChild.publicKey) throw new Error('BTC derivation failed');
+  const btcPayment = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({
+    pubkey: Buffer.from(btcChild.publicKey),
+    network: bitcoin.networks.bitcoin,
+  });
+  if (!btcPayment.address) throw new Error('BTC payment derivation failed');
+
+  // TRX (same secp256k1 + keccak256 as ETH, different encoding)
+  const trxWallet = ethers.Wallet.fromMnemonic(mnemonic, DERIVATION_PATHS.TRX);
+  const trxAddress = ethAddressToTron(trxWallet.address);
+
+  // SOL (ed25519)
+  const { key: solKey } = derivePath(DERIVATION_PATHS.SOL, seedHex);
+  if (!solKey || solKey.length !== 32) {
+    throw new Error('SOL derivation produced invalid seed length');
+  }
+  const solKeypair = Keypair.fromSeed(solKey);
+  const solAddress = solKeypair.publicKey.toBase58();
+
+  return [
+    { chain: 'ETH', address: ethAddress,                   derivationPath: DERIVATION_PATHS.ETH },
+    { chain: 'BSC', address: ethAddress,                   derivationPath: DERIVATION_PATHS.BSC },
+    { chain: 'BTC', address: btcPayment.address,           derivationPath: DERIVATION_PATHS.BTC },
+    { chain: 'TRX', address: trxAddress,                   derivationPath: DERIVATION_PATHS.TRX },
+    { chain: 'SOL', address: solAddress,                   derivationPath: DERIVATION_PATHS.SOL },
+  ];
+}
+
+/**
+ * ETH address (0x...) → TRX base58check (T...).
+ * Используют одну curve и keccak256-derivation; различается только prefix (0x41) + encoding.
+ */
+export function ethAddressToTron(ethAddr: string): string {
+  const hex = ethAddr.toLowerCase().replace(/^0x/, '');
+  if (hex.length !== 40) {
+    throw new Error('ethAddressToTron: invalid input length');
+  }
+  const bytes = Buffer.from(hex, 'hex');
+  const prefixed = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x41]), bytes]);
+  const h1 = createHash('sha256').update(prefixed).digest();
+  const h2 = createHash('sha256').update(h1).digest();
+  const checksum = h2.subarray(0, 4);
+  return bs58.encode(new Uint8Array(Buffer.concat([prefixed, checksum])));
+}
--- a/apps/api/src/services/wallet-ops.service.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/services/wallet-ops.service.ts
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /**
- * Wallet operations across chains: balance, transactions, build unsigned send tx.
- * Non-custodial: server NEVER signs — клиент подписывает приватом.
+ * Wallet read-only operations across chains: balance + tx history.
+ * Server-side signing now lives in `wallet-signer.service.ts` (custodial).
 */
 import { ethers } from 'ethers';
 import { env } from '../config/env';
@@ -250,14 +250,16 @@ async function solTransactions(address: string, limit: number): Promise<TxItem[]
  }));
 }

-// ─────────────────────── BUILD SEND (UNSIGNED TX) ───────────────────────
+// ─────────────────────── HELPERS ───────────────────────
+// (buildSend + chain-specific builders deleted — server signs custodially via wallet-signer.service.ts)

+/* deleted-marker-begin
 export interface BuildSendParams {
  chain: ChainCode;
  from: string;
  to: string;
  amount: string;
-  token?: string; // 'USDT' и т.д.; для native перевода — undefined
+  token?: string;
 }

 export type UnsignedTx =
@@ -442,8 +444,7 @@ async function deriveAta(
  );
  return pda;
 }
-
-// ─────────────────────── HELPERS ───────────────────────
+deleted-marker-end */

 const BASE58_ALPHABET = '123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz';

--- a/apps/api/src/services/wallet-signer.service.ts
+++ b/apps/api/src/services/wallet-signer.service.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,452 @@
+/**
+ * Server-side signing + broadcasting (custodial).
+ * Caller передаёт расшифрованную mnemonic + expectedFromAddress; signer:
+ *   1. деривит privkey из mnemonic
+ *   2. проверяет derived === expectedFromAddress (protect against derivation drift)
+ *   3. собирает tx (для TRX дополнительно verify raw_data против MITM)
+ *   4. подписывает
+ *   5. broadcast'ит в сеть
+ */
+
+import { ethers } from 'ethers';
+import { createHash } from 'crypto';
+import * as bip39 from 'bip39';
+import { BIP32Factory } from 'bip32';
+import * as ecc from 'tiny-secp256k1';
+import * as bitcoin from 'bitcoinjs-lib';
+import { Keypair, Connection, PublicKey, SystemProgram, Transaction } from '@solana/web3.js';
+import { derivePath } from 'ed25519-hd-key';
+import { env } from '../config/env';
+import { DERIVATION_PATHS, ethAddressToTron } from './wallet-generator.service';
+import type { ChainCode } from '../lib/address-validators';
+
+const bip32 = BIP32Factory(ecc);
+
+const ETH_RPC = 'https://ethereum-rpc.publicnode.com';
+const BSC_RPC = 'https://bsc-dataseed.binance.org';
+const SOL_RPC = 'https://api.mainnet-beta.solana.com';
+const TRONGRID = 'https://api.trongrid.io';
+const BLOCKSTREAM = 'https://blockstream.info/api';
+
+const USDT_TRC20 = 'TR7NHqjeKQxGTCi8q8ZY4pL8otSzgjLj6t';
+const USDT_BEP20 = '0x55d398326f99059fF775485246999027B3197955';
+const USDT_ERC20 = '0xdAC17F958D2ee523a2206206994597C13D831ec7';
+
+const ERC20_ABI = [
+  'function transfer(address to, uint256 amount) returns (bool)',
+];
+
+const HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS = 20_000;
+const MAX_GAS_PRICE_GWEI = 500;
+
+export interface SendParams {
+  chain: ChainCode;
+  mnemonic: string;
+  to: string;
+  amount: string;
+  token?: string;
+  expectedFromAddress: string;
+}
+
+export async function signAndBroadcast(p: SendParams): Promise<{ txid: string }> {
+  switch (p.chain) {
+    case 'ETH': return sendEvm(p, ETH_RPC, 1, USDT_ERC20);
+    case 'BSC': return sendEvm(p, BSC_RPC, 56, USDT_BEP20);
+    case 'BTC': return sendBtc(p);
+    case 'TRX': return sendTrx(p);
+    case 'SOL': return sendSol(p);
+  }
+}
+
+function assertAddressMatch(derived: string, expected: string, chain: ChainCode): void {
+  const norm = (s: string) =>
+    chain === 'ETH' || chain === 'BSC' ? s.toLowerCase() : s;
+  if (norm(derived) !== norm(expected)) {
+    throw new Error(`Derived ${chain} address ${derived} does not match stored ${expected}`);
+  }
+}
+
+// ─── EVM (ETH / BSC) ───
+
+async function sendEvm(p: SendParams, rpc: string, chainId: number, usdtAddr: string): Promise<{ txid: string }> {
+  const wallet = ethers.Wallet.fromMnemonic(p.mnemonic, DERIVATION_PATHS.ETH);
+  assertAddressMatch(wallet.address, p.expectedFromAddress, p.chain);
+  const provider = new ethers.providers.StaticJsonRpcProvider(rpc, chainId);
+  const signer = wallet.connect(provider);
+
+  const feeData = await provider.getFeeData();
+  const capWei = ethers.utils.parseUnits(String(MAX_GAS_PRICE_GWEI), 'gwei');
+  const effectiveGasPrice = feeData.maxFeePerGas ?? feeData.gasPrice;
+  if (!effectiveGasPrice || effectiveGasPrice.gt(capWei)) {
+    throw new Error(`Gas price exceeds cap (${MAX_GAS_PRICE_GWEI} gwei)`);
+  }
+
+  const nonce = await provider.getTransactionCount(wallet.address, 'pending');
+
+  // Принудительно EIP-1559 (type 2). ETH и BSC оба поддерживают с 2021.
+  // Если feeData не вернул maxFeePerGas — fallback но всё равно type 2 с computed cap.
+  const maxFeePerGas = feeData.maxFeePerGas ?? effectiveGasPrice;
+  const maxPriorityFeePerGas = feeData.maxPriorityFeePerGas ?? ethers.BigNumber.from(0);
+  if (maxFeePerGas.gt(capWei)) {
+    throw new Error(`maxFeePerGas exceeds cap (${MAX_GAS_PRICE_GWEI} gwei)`);
+  }
+  const feeFields: Partial<ethers.providers.TransactionRequest> = {
+    type: 2,
+    maxFeePerGas,
+    maxPriorityFeePerGas,
+  };
+
+  let tx: ethers.providers.TransactionRequest;
+  if (!p.token) {
+    const value = ethers.BigNumber.from(p.amount);
+    const balance = await provider.getBalance(wallet.address);
+    const estGas = ethers.BigNumber.from(21000);
+    const totalNeeded = value.add(effectiveGasPrice.mul(estGas));
+    if (balance.lt(totalNeeded)) {
+      throw new Error('Insufficient balance (value + gas)');
+    }
+    tx = { to: p.to, value, chainId, nonce, gasLimit: estGas, ...feeFields };
+  } else if (p.token.toUpperCase() === 'USDT') {
+    const iface = new ethers.utils.Interface([
+      ...ERC20_ABI,
+      'function balanceOf(address) view returns (uint256)',
+    ]);
+    const erc20 = new ethers.Contract(usdtAddr, iface, provider);
+    const tokenBal: ethers.BigNumber = await erc20.balanceOf(wallet.address);
+    if (tokenBal.lt(ethers.BigNumber.from(p.amount))) {
+      throw new Error('Insufficient token balance');
+    }
+    const nativeBal = await provider.getBalance(wallet.address);
+    const estGas = ethers.BigNumber.from(80000);
+    if (nativeBal.lt(effectiveGasPrice.mul(estGas))) {
+      throw new Error('Insufficient native balance for gas');
+    }
+    const data = iface.encodeFunctionData('transfer', [p.to, p.amount]);
+    tx = { to: usdtAddr, data, value: 0, chainId, nonce, gasLimit: estGas, ...feeFields };
+  } else {
+    throw new Error(`Token ${p.token} not supported on chainId ${chainId}`);
+  }
+
+  const sent = await signer.sendTransaction(tx);
+  return { txid: sent.hash };
+}
+
+// ─── SOLANA ───
+
+async function sendSol(p: SendParams): Promise<{ txid: string }> {
+  if (p.token) {
+    throw new Error('SOL SPL-token signing не реализовано (только native SOL)');
+  }
+
+  const seed = await bip39.mnemonicToSeed(p.mnemonic);
+  const { key } = derivePath(DERIVATION_PATHS.SOL, seed.toString('hex'));
+  if (!key || key.length !== 32) {
+    throw new Error('SOL derivation produced invalid seed length');
+  }
+  const keypair = Keypair.fromSeed(key);
+  assertAddressMatch(keypair.publicKey.toBase58(), p.expectedFromAddress, 'SOL');
+
+  const conn = new Connection(SOL_RPC, 'confirmed');
+  const toPk = new PublicKey(p.to);
+  const { blockhash, lastValidBlockHeight } = await conn.getLatestBlockhash();
+
+  const tx = new Transaction({
+    feePayer: keypair.publicKey,
+    blockhash,
+    lastValidBlockHeight,
+  });
+  tx.add(
+    SystemProgram.transfer({
+      fromPubkey: keypair.publicKey,
+      toPubkey: toPk,
+      lamports: BigInt(p.amount),
+    }),
+  );
+  tx.sign(keypair);
+
+  const sig = await conn.sendRawTransaction(tx.serialize());
+
+  try {
+    await conn.confirmTransaction({ signature: sig, blockhash, lastValidBlockHeight }, 'confirmed');
+  } catch (err: any) {
+    throw new Error(`SOL tx submitted but confirmation timed out (sig=${sig}): ${err.message}`);
+  }
+
+  return { txid: sig };
+}
+
+// ─── BITCOIN ───
+
+async function sendBtc(p: SendParams): Promise<{ txid: string }> {
+  if (p.token) throw new Error('BTC tokens не поддерживаются');
+
+  const seed = await bip39.mnemonicToSeed(p.mnemonic);
+  const root = bip32.fromSeed(seed);
+  const child = root.derivePath(DERIVATION_PATHS.BTC);
+  if (!child.publicKey) throw new Error('BTC derivation failed');
+
+  const network = bitcoin.networks.bitcoin;
+  const pubkeyBuf = Buffer.from(child.publicKey);
+  const payment = bitcoin.payments.p2wpkh({ pubkey: pubkeyBuf, network });
+  if (!payment.address || !payment.output) throw new Error('BTC payment build failed');
+
+  const fromAddr = payment.address;
+  assertAddressMatch(fromAddr, p.expectedFromAddress, 'BTC');
+
+  const [utxosRes, feesRes] = await Promise.all([
+    fetchJson(`${BLOCKSTREAM}/address/${fromAddr}/utxo`),
+    fetchJson(`${BLOCKSTREAM}/fee-estimates`),
+  ]);
+  const utxos = ((utxosRes as any[]) || []).filter((u) => u.status?.confirmed);
+  const feeMap = feesRes as Record<string, number>;
+  // Floor 15 sat/vB — иначе tx может реджектиться по min-relay-fee при congestion.
+  const feeRate = Math.max(Math.ceil(feeMap['1'] ?? feeMap['3'] ?? feeMap['6'] ?? 15), 15);
+
+  const amountSat = BigInt(p.amount);
+  if (amountSat > BigInt(Number.MAX_SAFE_INTEGER)) {
+    throw new Error('BTC amount exceeds safe integer range');
+  }
+
+  utxos.sort((a, b) => b.value - a.value);
+
+  const psbt = new bitcoin.Psbt({ network });
+  let totalIn = 0n;
+
+  const feeFor = (ins: number, outs: number) =>
+    BigInt(Math.ceil((ins * 68 + outs * 31 + 11) * feeRate * 1.1));
+
+  const selectedUtxos: typeof utxos = [];
+  for (const u of utxos) {
+    selectedUtxos.push(u);
+    totalIn += BigInt(u.value);
+    if (totalIn >= amountSat + feeFor(selectedUtxos.length, 2)) break;
+  }
+
+  if (totalIn < amountSat + feeFor(selectedUtxos.length, 2)) {
+    throw new Error('Insufficient BTC balance (incl. fee)');
+  }
+
+  for (const u of selectedUtxos) {
+    psbt.addInput({
+      hash: u.txid,
+      index: u.vout,
+      witnessUtxo: { script: payment.output, value: u.value },
+    });
+  }
+
+  psbt.addOutput({ address: p.to, value: Number(amountSat) });
+
+  const fee = feeFor(selectedUtxos.length, 2);
+  const change = totalIn - amountSat - fee;
+  if (change > 294n) {
+    psbt.addOutput({ address: fromAddr, value: Number(change) });
+  }
+
+  for (let i = 0; i < selectedUtxos.length; i++) {
+    psbt.signInput(i, {
+      publicKey: pubkeyBuf,
+      sign: (hash: Buffer) => Buffer.from(child.sign(hash)),
+    });
+  }
+  psbt.finalizeAllInputs();
+
+  const txHex = psbt.extractTransaction().toHex();
+
+  const broadcastController = new AbortController();
+  const tBroadcast = setTimeout(() => broadcastController.abort(), HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS);
+  let broadcast: Response;
+  try {
+    broadcast = await fetch(`${BLOCKSTREAM}/tx`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      body: txHex,
+      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'text/plain' },
+      signal: broadcastController.signal,
+    });
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(tBroadcast);
+  }
+  if (!broadcast.ok) {
+    const body = await broadcast.text().catch(() => '');
+    throw new Error(`BTC broadcast failed (${broadcast.status}): ${body.slice(0, 200)}`);
+  }
+  const txid = (await broadcast.text()).trim();
+  return { txid };
+}
+
+// ─── TRON ───
+
+async function sendTrx(p: SendParams): Promise<{ txid: string }> {
+  const wallet = ethers.Wallet.fromMnemonic(p.mnemonic, DERIVATION_PATHS.TRX);
+  const fromTronAddr = ethAddressToTron(wallet.address);
+  assertAddressMatch(fromTronAddr, p.expectedFromAddress, 'TRX');
+
+  const headers: Record<string, string> = { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' };
+  if (env.tronApiKey) headers['TRON-PRO-API-KEY'] = env.tronApiKey;
+
+  let txBody: any;
+  if (!p.token) {
+    const built = await fetchJson(`${TRONGRID}/wallet/createtransaction`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers,
+      body: JSON.stringify({
+        owner_address: fromTronAddr,
+        to_address: p.to,
+        amount: Number(p.amount),
+        visible: true,
+      }),
+    });
+    txBody = built;
+  } else if (p.token.toUpperCase() === 'USDT') {
+    const param =
+      tronAddressToHex(p.to).padStart(64, '0') +
+      BigInt(p.amount).toString(16).padStart(64, '0');
+    const built = await fetchJson(`${TRONGRID}/wallet/triggersmartcontract`, {
+      method: 'POST',
+      headers,
+      body: JSON.stringify({
+        owner_address: fromTronAddr,
+        contract_address: USDT_TRC20,
+        function_selector: 'transfer(address,uint256)',
+        parameter: param,
+        fee_limit: 100_000_000,
+        call_value: 0,
+        visible: true,
+      }),
+    });
+    txBody = built.transaction;
+  } else {
+    throw new Error(`Token ${p.token} not supported on TRX`);
+  }
+
+  if (!txBody?.txID || !txBody?.raw_data_hex || !txBody?.raw_data) {
+    throw new Error('TRX tx build failed (incomplete response)');
+  }
+
+  // ── MITM defense: 4-layer validation против compromised RPC ──
+
+  // 1. Recompute txID = SHA256(raw_data_hex) локально.
+  //    Если RPC лжёт о txID → attacker мог подсунуть raw_data, дренирующее на attacker.
+  const expectedTxId = createHash('sha256')
+    .update(Buffer.from(txBody.raw_data_hex, 'hex'))
+    .digest('hex');
+  if (expectedTxId !== txBody.txID) {
+    throw new Error('TRX txID mismatch — possible MITM/compromised RPC');
+  }
+
+  // 2. Expiration / timestamp bounds (защита от long-term replay).
+  //    TRON default expiration ~60s. Если RPC выставил годовой expiration —
+  //    подписанная tx replay'ится годами через скомпрометированную сеть.
+  const nowMs = Date.now();
+  const expiration = Number(txBody.raw_data.expiration);
+  const timestamp = Number(txBody.raw_data.timestamp);
+  if (!Number.isFinite(expiration) || !Number.isFinite(timestamp)) {
+    throw new Error('TRX tx malformed (no expiration/timestamp)');
+  }
+  if (expiration - nowMs > 90_000 || expiration <= nowMs) {
+    throw new Error(`TRX expiration out of bounds: ${expiration - nowMs}ms`);
+  }
+  if (Math.abs(timestamp - nowMs) > 30_000) {
+    throw new Error(`TRX timestamp drift too large: ${timestamp - nowMs}ms`);
+  }
+
+  // 3. Verify contract[0].type (защита от swap'а TransferContract → TriggerSmartContract).
+  //    Без этого RPC может вернуть TriggerSmartContract с косметическими полями to_address/amount.
+  const contract0 = txBody.raw_data.contract?.[0];
+  if (!contract0) {
+    throw new Error('TRX tx malformed (no contract[0])');
+  }
+  const expectedType = p.token ? 'TriggerSmartContract' : 'TransferContract';
+  if (contract0.type !== expectedType) {
+    throw new Error(`TRX contract type mismatch: expected ${expectedType}, got ${contract0.type}`);
+  }
+
+  // 4. Verify parameter.value (to / amount / contract_address / selector / data).
+  const contractValue = contract0.parameter?.value;
+  if (!contractValue) {
+    throw new Error('TRX tx malformed (no contract value)');
+  }
+  if (contractValue.owner_address !== fromTronAddr) {
+    throw new Error(`TRX owner_address mismatch: expected ${fromTronAddr}, got ${contractValue.owner_address}`);
+  }
+  if (!p.token) {
+    if (contractValue.to_address !== p.to) {
+      throw new Error(`TRX to_address mismatch: expected ${p.to}, got ${contractValue.to_address}`);
+    }
+    if (String(contractValue.amount) !== String(p.amount)) {
+      throw new Error(`TRX amount mismatch: expected ${p.amount}, got ${contractValue.amount}`);
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (contractValue.contract_address !== USDT_TRC20) {
+      throw new Error(`TRX contract mismatch: expected ${USDT_TRC20}, got ${contractValue.contract_address}`);
+    }
+    const data = String(contractValue.data || '');
+    if (data.length !== 128 + 8) {
+      throw new Error('TRX trc20 data length wrong');
+    }
+    // ВАЖНО: verify method selector (a9059cbb = transfer). Без этого RPC может вернуть
+    // approve(095ea7b3) — тот же layout (address,uint256) — и юзер approve'ит unlimited.
+    if (data.slice(0, 8).toLowerCase() !== 'a9059cbb') {
+      throw new Error(`TRX trc20 selector mismatch: expected a9059cbb (transfer), got ${data.slice(0, 8)}`);
+    }
+    const expectedParam =
+      tronAddressToHex(p.to).padStart(64, '0') +
+      BigInt(p.amount).toString(16).padStart(64, '0');
+    const actualParam = data.slice(8);
+    if (actualParam.toLowerCase() !== expectedParam.toLowerCase()) {
+      throw new Error('TRX trc20 parameter mismatch (to/amount tampering)');
+    }
+  }
+
+  // Sign verified txID
+  const sk = new ethers.utils.SigningKey(wallet.privateKey);
+  const sig = sk.signDigest('0x' + txBody.txID);
+  const sigHex =
+    sig.r.slice(2) +
+    sig.s.slice(2) +
+    (sig.recoveryParam ?? 0).toString(16).padStart(2, '0');
+
+  txBody.signature = [sigHex];
+
+  const broadcast = await fetchJson(`${TRONGRID}/wallet/broadcasttransaction`, {
+    method: 'POST',
+    headers,
+    body: JSON.stringify(txBody),
+  });
+
+  if (!broadcast?.result) {
+    const msg = (broadcast?.message && Buffer.from(broadcast.message, 'hex').toString()) || 'unknown';
+    throw new Error(`TRX broadcast failed: ${msg.slice(0, 200)}`);
+  }
+
+  return { txid: txBody.txID };
+}
+
+// ─── HELPERS ───
+
+const BASE58_ALPHABET = '123456789ABCDEFGHJKLMNPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijkmnopqrstuvwxyz';
+
+function tronAddressToHex(address: string): string {
+  let num = 0n;
+  for (const ch of address) {
+    const i = BASE58_ALPHABET.indexOf(ch);
+    if (i === -1) throw new Error('Invalid base58 character in TRON address');
+    num = num * 58n + BigInt(i);
+  }
+  const hex = num.toString(16).padStart(50, '0');
+  return hex.slice(2, 42);
+}
+
+async function fetchJson(url: string, init?: RequestInit): Promise<any> {
+  const controller = new AbortController();
+  const t = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS);
+  try {
+    const res = await fetch(url, { ...init, signal: controller.signal });
+    if (!res.ok) {
+      const body = await res.text().catch(() => '');
+      throw new Error(`Upstream ${res.status}: ${body.slice(0, 200)}`);
+    }
+    return await res.json();
+  } finally {
+    clearTimeout(t);
+  }
+}